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I. Introduction
Developing countries are facing a pressing need to stimulate economic
development amidst growing world economic and political problems. Development
plans to help alleviate economic and political problems have fallen short
and today, many countries are facing a reverse economic spiral which threatens
to undo the gains of the past two decades. Honduras, one of the poorest
countries in the Caribbean Basin , is one such country, struggling with a weak
economy and rising political and economic problems. In 1980, economic growth
slowed down as Gross National Product (GNP) grew by only 2%, as compared to
an average 7.8% in the previous four years. In 1981, the economy continued
its sluggish growth, and in real terms, even declined by 0.3%. These trends
are still present in 1982.1
On the domestic front, the manufacturing sector, in the past one of the
most dynamic sectors of the economy, also showed signs of sluggishness,
growing by 4.6% in 1980, as compared to an average 9.2% in the previous
4 years. The industrial sector was faced with a dwindling supply of
financial resources for working capital, plant expansion, and needed inputs,
as the economy contracted in a recessionary world environment. The slow-down
of domestic demand was triggered by an international recession which impacted
negatively on Honduras' export sector, which accounts for one-third of total
output. A contributing factor was the political problem unfolding in Central
America which motivated increased capital flight and discouraged investments
in the domestic economies of the area.
Honduras export dependence is relatively high. Exports as percentage of
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GNP represents 37% of total output. In the past two years, it has been
severely affected by a slackening of prices and demand in international
markets. In 1981, total exports of goods and services declined by 3.8%.
Honduras' main export crop,bananas, which accounts for about one-third of
its total exports, declined by almost 2%. Similarly, coffee exports, another
important export product, declined by a sizable 15.2%. In contrast, imports
of goods and services continued to grow as a brisk pace, giving rise to a
series of unprecedented deficits in the balance of payments, $212.4 million
in 1979, $342.1 million in 1980, and $300.3 million in 1981. The result was
a decline of 73% in the net international reserves for the period between
1980 and 1981 (see Table 1). Preliminary estimates for 1982 indicate that
this trend is likely to continue, placing severe pressures in foreign exchange
availability.
The impact of these developments on the manufacturing, as well as whole-
saling and retailing sectors, places further contracting pressures on the
economy. Availability of raw materials, inputs, and final products, by
necessity,become conditioned to a system of priorities and controls which
inhibits growth and development. Considering Honduras' export dependence,
these developments create a very difficult situation for a small and poor
country with limited resources to face its economic and development needs.
The deteriorating economic condition and the weakness of the export
sector pose an interesting dilemma for Honduras, in light of the opportunities
available to the countries of this region through the U.S. Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP) and President Reagan's proposed Caribbean Basin Strategy.
The Caribbean Basin Strategy could be the more significant of these two, if
implemented , as the economic development plan includes one-way access to U.S.
markets for the products of the countries in the Caribbean Basin for a period
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Key Economic Indicators: Honduras
All figures in million US$ Exchange rate as of June 1982
unless otherwise stated. US$1.00 - Lempiras 2.00 (Since 1931)
ITEM 1979 1980 1981 % Change
(Final) (Final) (Prelim) 1981/1980
ECONOMIC GROWTH
GDP at Current Prices 2,166 2,554 2,707 5.9%
GDP at Constant 1966 Prices 9831 1,002 1,006 .3%
Population (1,000) (mid-year) 3,564 3,691 3,821 3.5%
GOVERNMENT FINANCE:
Central Government Budget
Current Revenues 316 380 372.6 -1.9%
Current Expenditures 263.5 367.3 405 10.3-
Capital Expenditures 135.2 142 103 -37.8%
Deficit 95.8 198 206 3.17
Public Sector Debt Outstanding 837 1047 1308.2 24.9'
Domestic Debt 236 299 402.7 34.6%
External Debt 601 748 905.5 21.17
Public Sector Debt as % of Current GDP 27.8% 40.1% 48.3% 20.47
MONEY AND PRICES: (As of December 31 each year)
Money Supply 272 302 316 4.61
Bank Deposits 452 498 524 5.2
Consumer Price Index (1978 - 100) 122.6 136.6 149.1 9.2;
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
Net International Reserves
(Consolidated Banking System) 116 55 8.1 -85.4
Net International Reserves (Central Bank) 180 110 28.7 -73.6
Current Account Balance -192 -321 -273 -17.b
Debt Service Ratio (% Export Goods & Services) 11% 12.8% 14.3%
Total Exports (F.O.B.) Goods and Services 859 954 917 -3.8
Exports to the U.S. (F.O.B) 431.5 42.7.7 416 -2.7
Total Exports by Product Category:
Bananas 200 220 216 -1.8
Coffee 197 204 173 -15.2
Lumber 42 36 43 19.4
Refrigerated'Meat 61 61 46 -24.(
Metals 45 55 43 -21.t
Total Imports (C.I.F.) Goods & Services 1,072 1,300 1,217 -6.,
Imports of Goods (C.I.F.) from U.S. 358 426 386 -12.::
Petroleum Imports 113 171 162 -5.'
Trade with CACM
Exports (F.O.B.) 60 84 69 -17.
Imports (C.I.F.) 98 103 116 12.
Capital Account: Net Inflows 196 285.1 236 -17.
SOURCE: Central Bank of Honduras.
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of 12 years. It also includes the promotion of U.S. investment in the region
2
to accelerate job creation and expansion of production capabilities. The
external incentives provide access to U.S. markets for a significant amount
of manufactured products. One objective is to alleviate the economic problems
of the area by reducing export dependence in one or two primary products and
promoting exports of non-traditional products which are an important component
of world demand today.
The dilemma centers around the ability of the Honduran industrial sector
to take full advantage of these preferential treatments. Since access to
markets cannot in itself create the necessary conditions for successful
product introduction and consumer acceptance, other factors that affect
access must be taken into consideration. It is important, then, to try to
understand the underlying factors which may affect the Honduras' ability to
take advantage of these incentives.
The framework of this analysis will take into consideration only problems
related to manufactured products considered for access under the Caribbean
Basin strategy and GSP. The reason is that the rationality of the market-
place is such that it dictates techniques and relationships which are influenced
heavily by product characteristics and market structure. Manufactured products
are heterogeneous products and selling such products requires extensive
marketing effort and sophisticated marketing systems as the U.S. market is an
affluent, highly discriminatory and saturated market. Moreover, market
structure is characterized by monopolistic competition, dominated by a few
large firms performing extensive marketing to sell their products with highly
specialized distribution systems. The rationality of the marketplace, then,
requires a direction and degree of marketing specialization which may not be
present in the Honduran industrial sector at present and which may affect its
capabilities to export.
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In order to develop this analysis, it will be necessary to evaluate the
Honduran manufacturing and export sectors, as well as the existing facilitating
institutions and mechanisms in the system. The purpose of this analysis will
be to identify past problems, as well as present needs, in order to develop
guidelines for an export development strategy that can provide a viable frame-
work for the development of the exports of manufactured products within the
reality of the international marketplace.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE HONDURAN ECONOMY
a. Historical Analysis
Honduras is the second largest country in Central America, yet it is the
poorest. Its mountaneous terrain, which covers 64% of its land, remains mostly
unused due to inaccessibility and low population density. Its population of
3.4 million people is a very young one with about half under the age of 15.
Its labor force accounts for 28.8% of its population, making the dependency
ratio (the proportion of productive to nonproductive groups in society)
relatively high.3 Its geographic location makes it a natural for international
commerce with the United States, the Caribbean, the northern part of Latin
America, and Western Africa.
Honduras was discovered by Cristobal Colon and became a part of the
Spanish Colonial Empire. The Spaniards, however, left the large Honduran
territory almost uninhabited. When the Spanish arrived, the Indian population
had all but disappeared with the exception of small groups in the central
highlands of the territory. The Spanish came to the free world seeking precious
metals and centered economic activity around this pursuit, with few thoughts
on long range economic development. Honduras, like other Spanish colonial
territories, was subjected to economic mercantilism, a highly restrictive
and exclusive system of trade favorable to Spain. This control resulted in a
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myriad of prohibitions and restrictions which constrained Honduran trade with
the Central American territory as well as other Spanish territories, and
inhibited internal economic development.
Honduras came under Spanish control as part of New Spain, a territory
which included what is today Mexico and Central America. Inasmuch as Central
America was not particularly rich in precious metals, the economic history of
this colonial territory can best be described as a constant search by the
Spanish for a key to fast wealth, pursued by developing export crops one at a
time. Each endeavor was pursued with extraordinary single mindedness, deplet-
ing and finally exhausting human as well as other resources. These activities
condemned the region to a series of booms and busts, as the products would
4
enjoy a period of prosperity and profit, then decline and disappear.
This type of economic activity precluded any long range economic
stability and inhibited development of domestic factors of production. The
Spanish were only interested in depleting resources , not creating them. This
type of economic activity eventually lead to a stagnant Central American
economy dependent on a series of agricultural mono-experts, henceforth. In
the middle of tne Ibth century, however, it became apparent that the streams
and rivers of Honduras offered great potential for gold mining. Consequently,
Honduras became the center of gold panning activities in the Central America
territory. The initial gold exports were relatively large and promising and
Honduras became the most important producer of gold in the region.5
The decline of the gold industry was all too familiar. In the absence
of adequate factors of production and lack of manpower, the primative extractive
technology reduced the productivity of this industry to a trickle. However,
silver discoveries around Tegucigalpa once again made Honduras one 
of the
major exporters of precious metals in the area. The silver discoveries
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produced another boom in the Honduran economy. Negro slaves were introduced
to increase the labor force. However, primitative technology and the all too
familiar exploitation of the resources finally hampered the industry. The
inability, or unwillingness, of the Spanish to provide inputs to increase
production (for example, Spain was reluctant to provide mercury to extract
silver by more modern processes) quickly inhibited further development of
the industry. The prevalent fraud present in colonial mining industry
also inhibited the development of this industry. The Honduran mining
industry enjoyed only a fleeting prosperity, and soon the Honduran economy,
its resources depleted, was once again ignored by the Spanish authorities.
The brief periods of prosperity had given rise to a weak economy with a
small and weak resource base, and lacking a dynamic element to develop the
territory into a viable economic system, Honduras soon became a poverty
stricken territory.
The stagnant economies of Central America, greatly dissatisfied with
colonial economic policies, made separate bids for independence and became
independent nations in 1821. In 1824, and for a brief period, the Central
American countries attempted to maintain economic and political unity by
initiating an experiment in Unionism. Disagreements and political bickering,
however, dissolved the union and the Central American region became a group
of five independent nations-states, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.
b. The Export Economy of the Twentieth Century
A rapidly rising demand for bananas in the United States gave Honduras
an opportunity to enter the international economy once again at the 
end of
the 19th century. Due to its geographical location and proximity to the 
U.S.
market, Honduras had a special comparative advantage in growing this product,
-8-
and soon became a major producer of this product. The export industry became
the backbone of the Honduran economy and would dominate its export sector
and the Honduran economy for the next decades. Entry into international
markets, however, was thrust upon Honduras by external agents, as the lack of
adequate resource base allowed a few U.S. firms to dominate this export industry,
bringing in capital and management capabilities, as well as the extensive
marketing network necessary to distribute and sell the product in the United
States. These U.S. multinational corporations became a dominant factor in the
8
Honduran economy.
Honduras became a typical export economy under the umbrella of these
9
companies, becoming the stereotype of the "banana republic". The impact of
these activities brought the Honduran economy into the international economic
system, but the domestic market remained weak and small. Foreign investors
and managers become income-remitting agents because the goods needed to
maintain their higher standard of living were not produced in Honduras. The
small domestic market precluded manufacturing these goods domestically, and
the low purchasing power of the population did not warrant investment in
domestic production. Hence, what these groups spent domestically was on
imported luxuries. A commercial group quickly developed, and an ethnically
distinct group soon became a dominant factor in the import trade. This
group represented the more economically developed group in the domestic
economy, catering to the whims and tastes of the wealthy and the foreign
managers.
The result was that foreign factors, the wealthy, and the small trading
group consumed imported luxuries and invested little in the development of
the domestic economy. The domestic factor's income as well as the foreigner's
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was either remitted abroad looking for more profitable opportunities, or
spent on imported luxuries at home.
c. The Central American Common Market
Since the export sector failed to contribute to enlarge local markets,
as the profits of the export economy were either remitted abroad or spent
on imported luxuries by the more economically developed groups in the
economy, the governments of Central American countries decided to embarK
on a major development elfort. under the auspices of the United Nations,
and following prevailing economic development theories, the central American
countries rejected models ot outward development and chose import substitution
industrialization as a catalyst to promote rapid and sustained economic growtn.
The development model entailed the stimulation of the industrial sector to
provide the necessary linkages to stimulate the rest of the economy and allow
tne diffusion ot income and earnings into the economy and tnus create larger
and more affluent markets for self-sustained economic growth and development.
A most important element of this development plan was the new role of
government in the economic process. Under the new arrangement, the government
became an intermediary to direct economic activity for the benefit of the
domestic economy and to create a domestic resource base necessary to generate
the dynamic, self sustained economic growth sought by the development model.
The promotion of the industrial activities was envisioned as the way to
stimulate the development of domestic capital and human resources and create
the resource base necessary to spur economic development.
The five Central American countries formed the Central American common
market in an effort to overcome the limits of each country's small markets
and create a larger regional market to facilitate industrial growth. 
The
initial results were positive, as industrial production increased rapidly.
Nevertheless, by the early 1970's, it became apparent that tnis effort 
was
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insufficient. True, significant gains were made, as output increased and the
economy became more diversified. Industrialization, however, soon reached
its limits within the framework of import substitution.
New problems were faced by the Central American countries. Labor
absorption, an important element of this process, was not fully realized
in the extent necessary to provide an income generating force in the economy,
and demand remained relatively static as the mass markets never materialized.10
Similarly, the extensive subsidies and protective measures affected the
etficiency of the industrial sector, giving rise to a small sector composed
mainly ot light industries throughout Central America, all producing similar
products, Moreover, the benefits of intraregional trade were not evenly
distributed, as Guatemala and El Salvador generated two-thirds of the
intraregional trade.1
Furthermore, the structure of the external sector changed as the import
co-efficient grew faster than exports, and demand for consumer goods,
industrial raw materials, and semi-finished goods outspaced the ability of the
export sector to provide foreign exchange to finance these purchases. Finally,
the economic development rationale, which formulated a frameworK which included
a high degree of government intervention to promote the development of an
adequate resource base, propelled the public sector as a demander of foreign
exchange, in its attempt to accelerate economic development by financing develop-
ment projects with external loans. Acting as an intermediary to promote social
and economic progress and promote consumption without consideration of
economic restrictions, the government in effect placed further strains on
foreign exchange earnings.
From the onset, it was evident that the policies aimed at developing a
domestic industrial base would not be carried out without foreign investment.
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inasmuch as the domestic economy lacked technology and domestic capital to
embark in such an ambitious development program. From the onset, there was
a tendency to include foreign investment in the development model. One immediate
result was that indigeneous product development activities were inhibited
simply because there was no need for them. The strategy of including foreign
investment in the development model brought a proliferation of trademark and
brands, with a committment of resources to specific brand advertising.
Consumers, therefore, may have paid higher prices for products under import
substitution that would appear justified, similarly, the use of foreign
investment in development process placed additional claims on toreign
12
exchange earnings.
The highly-subsidized industrialization process with its foreign
component resulted in an industrial sector composed mainly of assembly or
conversion-type industries, i.e., industrial processes requiring very
limited capital investment (light industry) with a relatively small percent
of value added by the local economy but with a high content of semi-finished
inputs provided by external agents, with the resulting demand on foreign
exchange. Moreover, since all Central American countries have similar product
offerings, the small and static markets were soon saturated, as the industrial
sectors competed with similar products in the same markets.
The new economic development framework required increased absorption of
foreign exchange earnings by the industrial and public sectors. In the
absence of any link between industrial policy, government expenditures, and
increases or reductions in export earnings, import substitution industriali-
zation laid the groundwork for the inflationary pressures of the 1970's.
Additional pressures arose as the government increased the monetary supply
to accelerate economic activity and augment aggregate income. A rising
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bill for petroleum imports further aggrevated the problem and placed the
economy in a very precarious position. The automatic balancing of the inter-
national trade account through a reduction of imports or through higher tariffs
and other restrictions was no longer possible by the end of the 1970's.
The Central American common market went into a crisis in 1969, and the
common market arrangement has not yet survived this crisis. Some of the
elements of the common market arrangements are still observed on a bilateral
basis, imposing greater restraints on the Honduran industrial sector. As an
afterthought, the decision to become part of the Central American common
market did not give Honduras all of the advantages sought. It did, however,
provide the basis to start a domestic industrial resource base, an objective
sought by the development policies.
d. The Honduran Economy Today
i) The Industrial Sector
The industrial development process was important inasmuch as it enabled
the industrial sector to grow. The "common market era" in Honduras, however,
did little to create the type of industrial sector which could eventually
contribute to the dynamic self-sustained growth of the Honduran economy.
Examining the industrial sector today, it can be found that, while the
actual number of industrial enterprises increased during the initial impetus
of import substitution, the degree of industrialization or the participation
of industrial output in gross national product, increased modestly. In 1960,
the industrial sector accounted for 12% of value added to Gross National
Product. By mid 1970's, the sectoral participation rose to 13.3%. The
industrial sector is composed mainly of small and medium-sized firms. In 73%
13
of all industrial firms, the employees number less than twenty.
Similarly, the composition of output remained relatively unchanged. As
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shown in Table 2, in 1980, 86.6% of the total industrial output came from
traditional or residentiary industries, roughly the same participation as
in 1960.
Table 2
HONDURAS: OUTPUT OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
(in percentages)
1960 1970 1980
Final Consumption 86.6 83.7 86.4
Intermediary Industries 7.7 10.7 12.1
Metal Machinery Industries 7.3 6.0 1.5
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Secretaria Permanente del Tratado de Integracion
Economica Centroamericana (SIECA), and Banco Central
de Honduras.
Intermediate industries increased sectoral participation, accounting for
12.1% of the total industrial output by 1980. The metal machinery industry
showed little dynamism as sectoral participation declined in the 1970-1980
decade.1 4
As the Central American market unfolded, the Honduran industrial sector
lost some ground to Central American industries. In the early 60's, the
Honduran economy consumed 57.3% from domestic supply, but by the end of the
decade, this had declined to 55%. Central American products made significant
inroads in the Honduran market. While in 1960, the economy consumed only 5% of
products of the region, and by 1970, it was consuming 11.3%.1 5
Undoubtably, the modernizing aspect of the import substitution process
had a positive effect on industrial output and income. However, the industrial
development process lacked the adequate coordination for a rational development,
taking into account balance of payments affects and adequate complementarity,
i.e., utilization of domestic raw materials and resources.
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Consequently the Honduran industrial sector only evolved from a small
sector composed of residentiary industries into one composed of a thin group
of assembly or conversion-type light industries which have a high dependency
on external inputs, providing few linkages with the domestic resource
base.
The Honduran industrial manager can best be described as a commercial
industrialist, i.e., a type of businessman which is more of a salesman than
a risk-taker, in contrast with the typical risk-taking entrepreneur which
characterized the industrial development process of more industrialized
nations. This is a result of the protective umbrella of import substitution
industrialization. Under captive markets, risk taking is minimized, and
product innovation and marketing expertise is reduced considerably simple
because there is no need for them. The problem is that the commercial
industrialist, when attempting to compete in highly saturated international
markets, must do so with companies with a high degree of marketing expertise
arising from experience in domestic and international markets, where marketing
is a premium and risk-taking and product innovations in many instances, a
necessity for survival.
The recessionary forces which affect the industrial sector, as well as
the Honduran economy, have reduced foreign exchange earnings and caused a
serious problem: a shortage of funds to pay for needed inputs. Given the
structure of the industrial sector and its reliance on foreign inputs, the
problem posed by the weakening external sector has adversely affected the
dynamics of the industrial sector. The slow down of the industrial sector
has affected the retail and wholesale sectors as well, and as a result, the
recessionary climate has impacted on investment planning as the private
sector takes a "wait and see" attitude, and the rest of the world struggles
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with a stubborn recession.
ii) Export of Manufactures
The previous analysis highlighted the problems of the Honduran economy
and the industrial sector. Many of these problems were aggrevated by the
deterioration of the balance of payments position started in 198U. As the
recessionary climate began to affect world markets, softening demand and lowering
prices, the Honduran economy saw foreign exchange earnings and net capital
influx decline, affected by economic and political factors. The unfavorable
effect of these developments, plus the continued acceleration of demand 
for
industrial inputs and merchandise imports, seriously affected foreign exchange
availability in Honduras. These trends are expected to continue in 1982.
As seen in Table 3, the United States is Honduras' main trading partner
accounting for 53.5% of Honduras' total exports. Together with Germany
(Federal Republic) these two countries account for almost two-thirds of
total exports. Honduras' main export products are bananas and coffee. These
two products account for 54.1% of total exports, while manufactured goods
account for 2% of total exports (see Table 4).
Table 3
HONDURAS: MAIN TRADING PARTNERS
(as % of Total Exports)
Country/Region 1979 1980 1981
United States 58.9 52.1 53.5
Central America 8.2 10.2 8.9
Caribbean and Other
Latin American Countries 4.2 3.6 4.1
Germany (Fed. Rep.) 9.9 11.6 10.2
Rest of World 18.8 22.5 23.3
Source: Banco Central de Honduras
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Tabl 4
HONDURAS: MAIN EXPORT PRODUCTS
(as % of Total Exports)
Product 1979 1980 1981
Bananas 27.3 27.7 27.7
Coffee 26.8 24.8 22.2
Lead, Zinc and Silver 11.8 10.7 11.0
Refrigerated Meat, Shrimp
and Lobster 8.3 7.4 5.9
Sugar, Tobacco, Cotton 8.3 9.7 12.5
Manufactured Products 1.7 1.7 1.9
Total Exports (in millions
of U.S. dollars) 732.5 822.1 777.5
Source: Banco Central de Honduras
The rigidity of the import component of Balance of Payments can be observed
in Table 5. It can be seen that only 24% of imports are goods for 
final
consumption. Raw materials, fuels, oils, lubricants, capital goods 
and
equipment, account for almost 76% of the total imports. The 
export of
manufacturers has remained relatively stable over the past three years, composed
mainly of export products such as soap, canned fruits, cement, manufactured
wood products, barbed wire, cigarettes and tobacco products.
An analysis of Honduras export supply indicates that a very serious
problem exists inasmuch as firms with exportable supplies 
have little marketing
expertise for international markets. The extreme competitive 
pressures and
the lack of marketing expertise make exports of manufactured products 
a very
difficult venture for the average Honduran industrial manager.
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Table 5
HONDURAS: VALUE OF MAIN EXPORTS - JAN. TO APRIL
(in millions of dollars)
Product 1980 1981 1982/
Bananas 75.1 59.7 79.0
Coffee 124.1 88.1 79.9
Lumber 10.8 14.7 12.5
Aeat (Beef) 21.7 16.1 8.8
Silver, Lead, Zinc & Cadmium 12.2 11.6 15.6
Shrimp & Lobster 5.7 4.6 3.1
Sugar 13.6 21.8 5.7
Cotton 9.5 6.2 3.9
Beans & Corn - - 1.5
Resine 1.6 2.2 1.9
Pineapple 2.4 3.8 0.2
Manufactured Productsb  16.0 15.5 16.0
Total Jan/Apr 292.6 244.3 228.1
Total Exports Jan., Dec. 954.0 917.0 832.0/c
a/ preliminary figures
b/ soap, canned fruits, cement, manufactured wood products,
barbed wire, cigarettes and tobacco products
c/ estimate based on preliminary figures
c/
Source: Banco de Honduras
Perhaps the most striking problem of the industrial sector is the
inherent bias introduced in product decision by import substitution industri-
alization. In a protected environment, product decisions were made to conform
to development policies. The rationale for product decisions was affected
by the number of jobs created, the level of technology acquired, and the effect
on output and income. Thus, a firm found itself with the latest technology
and excess capacity, serving a small captive market but with no identified
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export markets or domestic market growth to absorb excess capacity.
This decision making process may have some validity in captive markets
of developing countries, but, in international markets, the firm must take a
different approach, i.e., produce the products that sell and be able to identify
markets and develop a strategy to serve them. The ability to identify
opportunities in international markets and the decision making process thereof
requires a high level of marketing expertise, especially in the markets of
manufactured products.
III. PROBLEMS OBSERVED
In addition to the general problems summarized previously affecting the
Honduran economy and the manufacturing sector's ability to take advantage of
external markets, the following summary of problems is presented.
A. Financial problems
1. Shortage of working capital that inhibits the industrial firm's
growth and its ability to develop markets adequately.
2. High cost of credit and restrictive credit policies that inhibit
capital formation and plant expansion required to tap foreign markets.
3. Non-availability of credit capital, rendering the Honduran industrial
sector incapable of providing supplier's credit, seriously affecting
its competitiveness in world markets.
4. Delays in providing foreign exchange and threats of devaluation
causes incertainty and raises costs to the exporter.
5. Lack of any meaningful government policy to address any of the
problems listed above.
B. Marketing Problems
1. Few inter-industry linkages that make imports costly and raise the
cost of export products. Assembly-type or conversion-type industries
have little competitive advantage in product, quality, and/or price.
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2. Quality standards and product offerings that are not directed at
satisfying international demand but are closely linked to internal
development and employment policies, rendering many products
inadequate for international markets. Existing exportable supply
is, for the most part, of non-durable consumer products, where
competition is the keenest.
3. Higher transportation costs to the United States and the Caribbean
arising from the reduction of imports. Especially affected is
air transportation, since the reduction of imports forced airlines
to reduce the number of slights and increase the price of trans-
portation causing problems to the export sector. Air transportation
to other areas (Northern Latin American and Western Africa) is
generally not adequate as there is no direct link with those markets
due to the small volume of trade. Sea transportation is generally
adequate to the United Sates, although the rates are relatively
high due to low levels of cargo shipments. Access to other markets
in Latin America or Africa is and continues to be a problem as
availability of services is very low, sometimes non existent.
C. Institutional Problems
1. Inadequate government and private sector cooperation. Even though
evidence suggests there is a high degree of consultation, Government
assigns itself the highest priority in the foreign exchange market
squeezing the private sector and straining its resources.
2. Lack of an adequate export promotion program. Export development
laws make exporting very cumbersome (registration procedures,
paperwork, taxes). For example, the tax, an anachronism of the
past, is a distorting disincentive in an economy that sorely
-20-
needs foreign exchange.
3. Overprotection of domestic industries. That acts as a disincentive
that effects efficiency. It impacts on competitive ability, especially
in markets where most opportunities lie for the efficient marketing-
oriented producer.
4. Lack of private sector cooperation. Although inter-industry groups
exist, most are concerned in studying national problems, rather
than concentrating in creating effective mechanisms to develop a
viable export sector for manufacturers. Attempts are being made in
this direction, but efforts are still insufficient to generate an
adequate mechanism to serve the manufactured export sector adequately.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Recent world trade patterns in manufactured products have tended to shift
international division of labor to the advantage of developing countries, since
the absolute and relative costs of production are lower in developing countries
than in industrial ones. To that effect, the United States, along with other
industrial countries have instituted incentives to help developing nations to
diversity their economies and accelerate development by providing access
to its markets through the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) and proposes
to further expand such access through the Caribbean Basin Strategy.
The analysis of the Honduran economy indicates that the problems inherent
in the industrial sector are not only related to current economic problems
but to structural and institutional deficiencies which must be addressed if
the export potential of the industrial sector is to be realized. A perusal
of the Honduran external sector indicated that exports of manufacturers are
still very low as Honduras continues to rely on export of agricultural products.
While Honduras has a geographical advantage to reach U.S. and Caribbean
-21-
markets, its industrial sector shows some weaknesses which may hamper, on the
short run, its ability to take full advantage of the preferential treatment
described above. These weaknesses include industrial product offering and
lack of marketing expertise in export activity.
The crux of the matter is the need of the industrial sector to develop
expertise in production, distribution and marketing of export products. The
challenge faced by the industrialist-exporter is to develop an adequate
product for export markets as well as the managerial skills to plan strategy
and effectively compete in foreign markets. The offer made by the United
States to provide access to its markets in order to stimulate growth and
development of the industrial sector is likely to have little, if no effect,
on the small and medium sized firm with no marketing expertise and inadequate
products for export markets. The markets of manufactured products 
in inter-
national trade is significantly different from trade in raw materials and
agricultural products. Trade activity of these products is a relatively
simple exchange of goods, buying and selling operations which require 
little
marketing effort. However, buying and selling manufactured goods is a
different situation. Marketing expertise becomes a primary activity of 
the
firm in order to sell products which serve a significantly wider range of
consumer wants and needs, geographically dispersed, and with varying 
levels
of income, tastes and consumption patterns. The adaption must be 
there it
the Honduran industrialist-exporter is to realize the goal of developing an
acceptable volume of exports of Honduran manufactured products.
V. AN EXPORT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR HONDURAS
The Honduran government should initiate, in cooperation with 
private
sector, a full-fledged campaign to promote exports. The export 
promotion
activity should make clear the role of the private sector 
and government
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activities in export development and provide clear guidelines and mechanisms
to achieve this goal.
1. In the short-term, the export development strategy should include
provisions to:
a. Direct resources to develope adequate management/human resources
for export development. This means extensive training and
education with special emphasis of the marketing aspects of
exporting.
b. Eliminate export disincentives like export taxes and other
such taxes that affect cost and efficiency in the export sector.
c. Make financial resources available, at low cost, to qualified
exporters for market development and working capital.
d. Promote the development of a prototype export trading company,
to provide procurement, assembly, distribution and marketing
functions to the export sector in specialized product areas
and regions. The key provisions of this prototype organization
should be to provide needed expertise to reach the following
long-term objectives:
- - specialization of product/geographical area
- - displacement of foreign-owned resources in export activities.
- - centralization of buying, selling, and other marketing functions
to escape constraints imposed by small and medium sized production
capabilities.
- - centralization of financing functions in order to liberate
industrial capital to expand industrial capabilities along
export market needs.
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2. In the long run, the export development strategy should 
aim to:
a. Promote industries that provide domestic linkages (for example,
agribusiness and labor-intensive industries) with identified
export market potential.
b. Develop the capabilities of domestic resources, expecially
managerial resources, to displace foreign-owned 
resources
in export industries.
c. Phase-out foreign ownership in qualified export enterprises
and export trading companies to develop a domestic resource
base to benefit the Honduran economy.
d. Review the import substitution process to provide 
a more
selective process, providing protection to industries which
provide linkages with domestic resources.
e. Gradually eliminate protection of assembly or convention-
type industries to redirect resources to industrial 
activities
with exportable supply.
The export development strategy outlined above should 
require a definite
commitment by the private sector to assume higher responsibility 
in the
development process, providing more resources to the 
government so that
excessive intervention in the economic system is unnecessary. 
The rationality
of the international marketplace dictates new directions 
for the export
sector. Unless some measures are introduced to promote 
development of the
necessary expertise to promote new mechanisms 
for the marketing of export
products (as is the case of the export trading company) 
as well as other
incentives to develop adequate resources over the long-run, 
it is highly
unlikely that countries like Honduras can benefit 
from the U.S. offer in the
long run.
-24-
The major problem is to achieve the adequate perspective on the problems
which are outlined in this paper. This perspective calls for long-term solu-
tions to make the export sector a viable one. This may well require changes
in the economic, political and social structure and imply long-term solutions
to short-term necessities. Unless this perspective is achieved, any effort
to stimulate exports without the adequate development of resources may prove
futile and snort-lived, and not in a magnitude that can effectively help
develop a dynamic industrial sector that can contribute to self-sustained
growth and development.
NOTES
Banco Central de Honduras
Other industrial countries also give preferential treatment to the
manufactured products of developing countries. However, due to its geo-
graphical location, the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) offers
the Honduran export sector a more immediate and logical opportunity. This
paper, therefore, will address only the problems related to access to U.S.
markets.
3The dependency ratio is calculated by dividing the economically active
population by total population. In Honduras, the depandency ratio is 1:3.
Murdo J. McLeod, Spanish Central America (Berkeley, Calif.: University
of California Press, 1973), pp. 46-68.
Ibid., pp. 55-56.
Ibid., p.58.
7
Marta Ortiz-Buonafina, The Impact of Import Substitution on Marketing
Activities (Washington, D.C.: The University Press of America, 1981), p. 12.
8
Mario Rodriguez, Central America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1965), p. 103.
Ibid., p. 106.
10
Marta Ortiz-Buonafina, The Impact of.... , p. 22.
1Guatemala and El Salvador may have had a comparative advantage in
geographical location and resource availability which may account for this
phenomenon. Both countries have a relatively larger pool of labor force and
lie in the southern coast of Central America. This geographical location
links all the Central American countries with the exception of Honduras.
Its mountaneous terrain may have hampered access to the rest of the Central
American markets and given the other two countries a comparative advantage
in the Central American Common Market.
12
Marta Ortiz-Buonafina, The Impact of.... , pp. 59-60.
13
Banco Central de Honduras.
141Residentiary industries are those that evolved from cottage industries,
such as textiles, shoes, etc. and which form the basic industrial structure of
most economic societies. Intermediary industries are those producing semi-
finished or intermediate goods for the industrial sector.
El Desarrolo Integrado de Centro America en la Presente Decada (Buenos
Aires: Instituto para la Integracion de America Latina BID/INTAL, 1974), Tomo 4,
pp. 25-28.
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